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Abstract 
 
Union membership rose by 100,000 in 1999 ending two decades of sustained membership 
losses – the longest, deepest decline in British labour history yielding a cumulative fall of 
over 5 million members.  This paper analyses that haemorrhage in membership and asks 
whether or not the recent increase augurs a resurgence in unions’ fortunes. 
Membership data and voice arrangements are described first.  Then the decline in 
membership in the 1980s and 1990s is analysed, emphasising both the failure of unions to 
achieve recognition in newly established workplaces and plummeting density where unions 
remain recognised.  The health of unions turns, in part, on their appeal to potential members, 
so their “sword of justice” impact is set out next showing how unions have an egalitarian 
effect on the distribution of pay, cut accidents and promote both family friendly and equal 
opportunity policies in the workplace. 
It is unlikely that employment will grow disproportionately in unionised sectors of the 
economy.  So any revival of unions depends on organising activity among both individuals 
and firms.  The pivotal importance of new recognitions is discussed by analysing three forms 
of marriage between capital and labour – true love, convenience and shotgun.  The paper 
concludes that a twin track organising strategy would help unions partially reverse their 
membership losses – signing up new employers but also focusing on the 3 million plus free 
riders who are covered by collective agreements but not members. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Union membership rose by 100,000 in 1999 ending two decades of sustained membership 
losses – the longest, deepest decline in British labour history yielding a cumulative fall of 
over 5 million members.  This paper analyses that haemorrhage in membership and asks 
whether or not the recent increase implies a resurgence in unions’ fortunes. 
Data on membership are set out and examined in Section 2.  It is noted that 
considerable care needs to be taken when interpreting figures supplied by the Certification 
Officer.  The implications of falling membership for different worker voice mechanisms are 
also described in Section 2.  The decline in membership in the 1980s and 1990s is analysed in 
Section 3.  This emphasises both the failure of unions to achieve recognition in newly 
established workplaces and plummeting density where unions remain recognised.  The future 
of unions turns, in part, on what impact they have on both economic efficiency and equity.  
The former outcome has been well documented previously but the “sword of justice” effect 
of trade unions is somewhat neglected.  Section 4 tries to plug this gap by assessing the 
impact of unions on the distribution of pay, the establishment accident rate and the provision 
of workplace equal opportunity and family friendly policies.  Section 5 looks to the future.  It 
is unlikely that employment will grow disproportionately in unionised sectors of the 
economy.  So any revival of unions turns on organising activity among both individuals and 
firms.  The pivotal importance of new recognitions is discussed by analysing three forms of 
marriage between capital and labour – true love, convenience and shotgun.  The paper 
concludes that a twin track organising strategy would help unions partially reverse their 
membership losses – signing up new employers but also focussing on the 3 million plus free 
riders who are covered by collective agreements but not members. 
 
 
2.  Description of Data 
 
At the end of the century 7.3 million employees in Great Britain were union members, 
equivalent to 3-employees-in-10.  Information on trade union membership and density need 
to be treated with great caution.  There are now two main sources of such data:  the 
Certification Officer and the Labour Force Survey.  The annual report of the Certification 
Officer details union-reported membership from unions with headquarters in Great Britain.  
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These figures sometimes include members who are retired, unemployed or self-employed.  
Some people working outside the UK – in Gibraltar or Hong Kong for example – are also 
included (see Hicks 2000 for more details on these and other complications with Certification 
Officer data).  Trade union density is the percentage of employees or the workforce who are 
union members.  It is a tricky exercise to match the numerator with the denominator to 
calculate such density figures.  For example, should the denominator refer to employees in 
employment or to the civilian workforce which adds in the self-employed and unemployed? 
The Certification Officer data are the only source which provides a long time series on 
membership (since 1892).  Fortunately, they have been supplemented since 1989 with 
information from the household-based Labour Force Survey which provides evidence on the 
straightforward question:  what fraction of employees in employment are union members?  In 
the three decades from 1950 union membership grew steadily from 9.3 million in 1950 to 
13.3 million in 1979, such that by 1980 half the civilian workforce was in membership 
(Table1 and Figure 1).  Since 1980 unions have lost over 5 million members and only just 
over a quarter of the civilian workforce were in membership at the turn of the century.  The 
Certification Officer data are supplemented in Table 2 with more recent information on the 
fraction of Great Britain employees who are union members.  Membership fell from 8.94 
million in 1989 to 7.15 million in 1998.  In 1999 membership rose for the first time for 20 
years but density was virtually constant because the number of employees also increased. 
Membership data alone are a very blunt indicator of unions’ role and contribution to 
industrial relations.  Therefore, information on the coverage of collective agreements is 
cross-tabulated with membership details in Table 3 to provide a fuller picture for 1999.  The 
evidence in this table is quite remarkable.  The majority of employees (13.6 million or 57%) 
are neither a union member nor covered by a collective agreement.  Of those 8.5 million 
employees covered by an agreement, under two thirds (5.4 million) are union members. 
Looking at the evidence the other way round, nearly a quarter of union members are not 
covered by a collective agreement (1.6 million out of 7.0 million).  These will include people 
who retain their membership even though their employer no longer recognises the union for 
collective bargaining. It also includes many teachers and nurses who are union members but 
whose pay is set by arbitration by Review Bodies. In other cases the employer recognises a 
union for grievance and discipline matters but not for pay bargaining. 
30% of employees are presently union members.  Density alters by demographic, job 
and workplace characteristics (see Table 4).  Density varies little by gender and by ethnic 
origin.  It rises with age, falling off slightly past 50.  Those with higher education have 
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density levels substantially above those with fewer qualifications.  This latter finding can also 
be shown when we consider density for selected occupations.  Teachers, nurses and other 
professional workers have the highest density of any occupation (49%), and sales occupations 
(11%) the lowest.  Density rises sharply by tenure, in part a mirror image of the well-known 
finding that labour turnover is lower in workplaces which recognise a union. 
Workplace characteristics are important too.  Small workplaces (under 25 employees) 
have density levels under half those of larger establishments.  People who work in public 
administration, education and health are far more likely to be members than those employed 
in business services or hotels and restaurants.  Manufacturing (28%) now has union density 
below that for the whole economy (30%).  An individual in Scotland or Wales is more likely 
to be a union member than one in England, and among regions the north-east has a density 
level double that of the south-east. 
Hand-in-hand with the decline in union density a profound change has occurred in the 
type of mechanisms that provide employees with voice.  Bryson (2000) uses successive 
WIRS to chart this trend (see Table 5).  He points out that since 1984 in workplaces with 25+ 
employees there has been little change in the proportion of workplaces without any employee 
voice, the figure remains at around 1-in-6.  But between 1984 and 1998 “there was a steep 
decline in voice arrangements where unions formed the single channel of communication 
(union-only voices) and a less marked decline in ‘dual-channel’ voice involving union and 
non-union channels in combination”.  These two changes were offset by a large boost in 
voice arrangements which did not involve unions.  If the sample is extended to workplaces 
with 10+ employees, in 1998 only 1-in-20 used union-only communication while nearly half 
used non-union voice only. 
Table 5 also demonstrates the switch away from representative voice towards direct 
voice.  Representative voice occurs via a recognised trade union or a functioning joint 
consultative committee (or works council).  Direct voice by-passes these intermediate 
institutions and, instead, management and employees communicate directly with one another.  
Indicators of direct voice include team briefings, regular meetings between senior 
management and the workforce and problem solving groups like quality circles.  Between 
1984 and 1998 the proportion of workplaces with only representative voice arrangements 
halved, those relying on just a direct voice nearly trebled.  However, it should be remembered 
that WERS only reports the incidence of such direct voice rather than the use made of these 
mechanisms. 
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Evidence from the WIRS/WERS panel of continuing workplaces shows that the decline 
in union-only voice is not caused by derecognition but rather a deliberate switch from 
single-channel union representation to dual channel arrangements.  But the corresponding 
jump in non-union voice arrangements is accounted for by new workplaces adopting direct 
communication methods (Millward et al., 2000).  In a nutshell continuing unionised 
workplaces have added-on complementary direct communication while nearly all new 
workplaces opt for direct methods without recognising unions.  It is a nice question whether 
direct channels – providing a voice for non-union members – reflect declining density or 
cause it. 
 
 
3.  Explanation for Decline of Unions 
 
Whichever way one looks at it the last two decades of the twentieth century were a period of 
relentless, sustained corrosion in British unionisation.  Membership fell by 5.5 million and 
density from over half to under one third of employees.  The number of workers whose pay 
was set by collective bargaining halved from around 70% to 35%. 
Writing in 1991, I noted (Metcalf, 1991) that there were three main explanations for the 
decline of unionisation in the 1980s.  First, Carruth and Disney (1988) asserted that “the 
downturn in membership is entirely a cyclical phenomenon”.  But this cannot be so because if 
macroeconomic variables were the sole cause of membership fluctuations, the gradual fall in 
unemployment from 3 million to 1 million since 1993 (and the fact that real wage growth was 
below trend in this period) would have given a major boost to membership.  Second, Freeman 
and Pelletier (1990) calculated a ‘legislation index’ according to how favourable or 
unfavourable various strands of labour law were to unions in each year.  Changes in the law 
were held to be “responsible for the entire decline” in density levels.  Third, Booth (1989) 
suggested that nearly half of the decline in membership was attributable to changes in the 
composition of industry alone.  Changes in industry mix are unlikely to be the main story 
because the trend away from manufacturing, male, large workplace–intensive employment 
towards private service, female, small workplace–intensive employment was already in 
existence in the 1970s when union membership rose by nearly 3 million.  I noted that 
“composition effects neglect the attitudes and effects of the main actors – employers and 
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unions.  They beg the key question:  why have unions not been able to organise and recruit in 
expanding areas of employment?” (p.23). 
It is very plausible that macroeconomic variables, the structure of jobs and the 
composition of the workplace and the role of the state each contribute to the ebb and flow of 
union membership.  But it is necessary to go behind the correlations and examine the process 
of decline – to see the part played by employers and by unions and their actual and potential 
members.  We are fortunate because successive Workplace Industrial (Employment) 
Relations Surveys permit just such an analysis (see the appendix for description of the 1998 
WERS sample). 
There is no evidence that union activity – the wage premium causing higher labour 
costs for example – results in a higher rate of closures among union plants compared with 
their non-union counterparts.  Table 6 shows that closure rates were virtually identical for 
both union and non-union workplaces between 1984 and 1998.  Nor has management 
embarked on wholesale derecognition of trade unions.  The evidence in Table 6 suggests that 
the derecognition rate was around 1% a year between 1984 and 1998.  Although 
derecognition in some national newspapers, TV and docks generated bitter industrial disputes 
and considerable media interest, it turns out that such management action was quite rare (for 
related evidence see eg Towers, 1997 and Gall and McKay, 1999). 
Rather, Machin (2000) confirms my earlier speculation that union decline turns mainly 
on the inability of unions to achieve recognition in young workplaces reflecting, for example, 
Thatcherite views among some managers and the growth of investment from overseas.  This 
is fully documented in Table 7.  Consider initially panel A.  In 1980 establishments under 10 
years old had a recognition rate of .59 almost as large as the fraction of 10+ years old 
workplaces which recognised unions (.65).  But over the next two decades unions found it 
progressively harder to organise new workplaces.  By 1998 just over a quarter of workplaces 
under 10 years of age recognised a trade union, only half the corresponding figure for older 
workplaces.  
Panel B shows that this inability to get much of a foothold in new workplaces is not, as 
is often asserted, confined to private services.  More stunning is the virtual collapse of 
recognition in newer manufacturing plants.  Only 14% of manufacturing workplaces set up 
after 1980 recognise a union compared to 50% of those established in 1980 or before.  Thus, 
there is a 36% point gap in recognition rates for manufacturing plants established before 1980 
than after 1980.  The corresponding gap for private services is 10 percentage points and there 
is no significant gap for public sector workplaces.  But these lower recognition rates in newer 
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workplaces are not the end of the story.  Machin goes on to show that even when such 
recognition is achieved, union density is some 20% (ie .11 points) lower than it is in older 
workplaces. 
It is apparent that any resurgence of unionisation will require more recognition 
agreements in younger workplaces.  Mechanisms to achieve this are discussed in Section 5.  
But before we leave this analysis of decay, two further points must be mentioned.  First, there 
is a further cohort effect affecting union membership.  It is well known that young workers 
have lower rates of unionisation than older workers (see eg Table 4) but, more serious from 
unions’ viewpoint, union density has dropped both absolutely and proportionately more 
among newish entrants than among older workers: 
 
 Density % 
Age 1983 1998 
18-29 44 18 
30-39 51 30 
40+ 57 33 
 
This matter has been investigated using sophisticated statistical analysis by Disney et 
al., (1998) who confirm that successive birth cohorts have a declining probability of joining 
unions.  The plot of density against age in Table 4 is an inverted-U for the 1999 cross section.  
What has been happening is that the inverted-U for 1999 is below that for 1989 which, in 
turn, was below that for 1979.  In each case the distance between the inverted–Us is getting 
larger for younger cohorts than for older ones – young employees are now less likely than 
ever to belong to a union than at any time since World War II.  There is strong persistence in 
union membership and, more importantly, non-membership.  Therefore, the trend to 
successively lower density rates by birth cohort will only be reversed when unions are able to 
boost membership rates among younger workers.  Efforts by the union movement to do just 
this via the newly established TUC-sponsored organising academy are discussed in Section 5. 
Thus, the probability of young workplaces having recognition has fallen over time, both 
absolutely and relatively to that of older workplaces.  Likewise, the likelihood of a young 
worker being a union member has declined over time, both absolutely and relatively, 
compared with that for older workers.  Which of these two, albeit interrelated, cohort effects 
is more important in explaining union decline?  A definitive answer will only be possible 
when we have a matched panel of workplaces and individual employees.  But Machin (2000) 
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speculates that it is the workplace cohort effect which dominates because workers of all ages 
have a lower probability of being a union member in workplaces established since 1980.  
This is surely plausible:  there is less likely to be a union to join – no recognition – in younger 
workplaces, which lowers the probability of membership at all ages.  Young workers are 
particularly affected because they are more likely to work in young workplaces.  In 1998, for 
example, in workplaces established prior to 1980 only 10% of the workforce was aged under 
25, whereas in those set up in the 1980s and 1990s the corresponding figure is 17%.  
Second, while recognition in younger workplaces is vital to the long-run health of the 
union movement we should not lose sight of falling density where unions are recognised.  
Indeed, in the short-run the benefit:  cost ratio of focusing on retaining existing members and 
absorbing free riders is likely to be higher than that for recognition activity.  Consider the 
following information: 
 
 
Workplaces with  
recognition, density % 
1980 78 
1998 56 
 
Some 10 million people work in establishments where one or more unions are 
recognised.  This implies that if unions could regain their average membership density of 
1980, membership would rise by some 2.2 million.  
In 1980 1-employee-in-4 was in a closed shop, but the legislative onslaught against 
trade unions in the 1980s meant that by 1990 very few workplaces still had a closed shop.  
Table 8 shows that the sample of WIRS workplaces with a closed shop fell from 337 to 68 in 
the six year period 1984 to 1990.  Thus, there was a distinct shift in the form recognition 
took, away from the closed shop towards simple recognition.  After careful statistical 
analysis, Millward et al., (2000) conclude that, “the decline in the closed shop and strong 
management endorsement of membership were the main reasons for the fall in mean union 
density in unionised workplaces between 1984 and 1990” (p.150).  But the picture is “quite 
different” for the period 1990 to 1998.  Density fell for all three types of union recognition – 
“employees appeared to have lost their appetite for unionism”.  The fall in WERS aggregate 
density was 13 percentage points 1990-98.  Only a quarter of this arose from the decline in 
the incidence of closed shops or strong management recommendation to join the union.  
Thus, 10 percentage points are attributable to the reduced propensity to belong to a union 
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even when encouraged to do so.  In a nutshell, in the 1980s unions lost the support of the 
state and managers, whereas in the 1990s “they also lost the support of many employees” 
(p.151).  This implies a difficult choice for unions:  the opportunity cost of devoting 
resources to organising may be less attention to servicing existing members and the latter 
may yield more members per £ spent. 
 
 
4.  Unions and the Sword of Justice 
 
Alan Flanders suggested that unions have both a “vested interest” effect and a “sword of 
justice” impact.  Broadly, these can be thought of as the impact on economic efficiency and 
on equity or due process respectively.  The vested interest effect has been well-documented 
(see eg Metcalf, 1993 for a survey).  In the 1960s and 1970s productivity levels in 
manufacturing workplaces were lower where unions were recognised, but this effect was 
attenuated during the 1980s when productivity growth was higher in unionised than 
non-union workplaces.  Most studies also show that union recognition siphons off some 
surplus profits in monopolistic firms and workplaces to the benefit of employees via a wage 
premium.  The balance of the evidence also suggests that where unions are recognised, 
physical investment rates are lower but investment in human capital higher than it is in 
non-union counterpart workplaces. 
Much less well documented is the sword of justice effect of trade unions.  What follows 
analyses three strands of this union role.  It is shown that unions narrow the distribution of 
pay, lower the rate of industrial injuries and promote equal opportunity and family friendly 
policies.  Such outcomes may well appeal to many among the majority of employees neither 
covered by collective bargaining nor a union member, and the implications of these findings 
for the future health of unions is pursued in Section 5. 
 
4.1  Union wage policies 
 
A stylised industrial relations fact is that the spread of pay among unionised workers is lower 
than the spread among their non-union counterparts.  There are three routes to this greater 
equality of pay in the organised sector.  First, unions reduce pay dispersion within 
establishments.  Unions prefer a single rate of pay for each occupational group whereas in 
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non-union firms with individual pay determination supervisors decide pay levels within a 
range.  Unions also prefer seniority-based progression of rates.  These preferences stem from 
unions’ desire for objective standards, where pay goes with the job, because of concerns 
about favouritism, discrimination and the measurement of the “true” contribution where pay 
is subjectively related to the “merit” of the individual. 
Next, across firms and workplaces union wage policies lead to a narrower wage 
dispersion in the organised compared with the unorganised sector.  At the turn of the last 
century the Webbs (1902) introduced the concept of “the common rule” into the vocabulary 
of industrial relations and used it to define trade union objectives.  The fixing of a standard 
rate of pay – the rate for the job – was the pivotal common rule.  The strength of this common 
rule has ebbed away as the locus of collective bargaining in the private sector has switched 
from national multi-employer agreements to firm or workplace agreements.  Around a quarter 
of private sector employees are covered by collective agreements of which under a tenth are 
covered by national agreements.  Consequently the dispersion of pay in the organised sector 
is likely to be higher now than it was in the past.  Nevertheless, the organised sector is still 
likely to have less dispersion, other things equal, than the unorganised.  Multi-employer 
bargaining still exists in parts of printing, textiles, clothing and construction.  And even in 
sectors where national bargaining has disintegrated unions own internal organisation permits 
or encourages pay comparisons across companies via research support for collective 
bargaining, the way lay officers are taught to formulate pay claims, industry level forums, 
and the involvement of full time officials in local pay negotiations. 
Third, unions operate a de facto minimum wage policy through collective bargaining.  
In Local Government for example the lowest basic rate in the 1997 national agreement was 
£4 per hour and presently many public sector unions are achieving a £5 per hour minimum.  
And the Transport and General Workers Union reports a similar lower bound negotiated for 
some industrial cleaners, knitwear operatives, bar staff and retail workers. 
The upshot of these union wage policies – which operate within and among firms and 
which cut off the bottom end of the pay distribution – is that we expect unionised workers to 
have a more equal distribution of wages than their non-union counterparts.  Some evidence 
on this is given in Table 9, taken from the Labour Force Survey covering over 16,000 
employees a quarter.  Two measures of the dispersion of log earnings are presented:  the 
standard deviation and the 90th percentile minus the 10th percentile.  Consider initially the raw 
earnings data.  On both measures the union pay distribution is more concentrated than the 
non-union pay distribution.  But of course, this could be nothing to do with unions, instead it 
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may reflect the fact that unionised workers and jobs are more similar than non-union ones.  
To allow for this possibility the bottom panel of the table presents evidence on the dispersion 
from the residuals from a regression equation that permits controls for the heterogeneity of 
people and jobs between the union and non-union sectors. 
Two strong findings occur.  First, considerable pay dispersion persists even when 
controls are included – the dispersion in the residuals is around two-thirds the dispersion in 
the raw data.  Second, it remains the case that, even when we compare essentially 
homogenous employees in similar workplaces and jobs, the pay dispersion is lower for union 
members than for non-union employees.  Thus union wage policies do matter – the lower 
dispersion in pay among unionists is not just because they are more similar than 
non-unionists. 
So far we have shown that unions reduce the spread in the pay distribution.  But they 
also do something more profound – they compress the pay structure between women and 
men, blacks and whites and those with health problems and the healthy.  This impact of 
unionisation on the pay structure by gender, ethnicity, health and occupation is set out in 
Table 10.  The results are quite remarkable.  Unionisation narrows the wage structure for 
each pair of groups.  The fraction of employees who are union members is rather similar for 
each of the groups, at around a third.  Thus the impact of unionisation on the pay structure 
comes via the premium associated with union membership.  In each case the lower paid 
group – females, non-whites, those with health problems and manuals – receive a higher 
premium if they are a union member than do their higher paid counterpart groups. 
For example, female union members earn 8.7% more than a woman with the same 
characteristics who is not in a union.  By contrast male union members earn no more than 
their non-union counterparts.  Similarly, the payoff to union membership for non-whites is 
8.4%, more than double the 3.9% premium for whites.  Likewise, union membership provides 
a bigger return to those with health problems (5.3%) and manual workers (12.9%) than the 
healthy (3.9%) and non-manuals (3.0%). 
Consequently the average wage structure is compressed by the following percentages 
compared with what it would be if there were no unions: 
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Group 
If there were no unions,  
wage structure would  
be wider by % 
Male/female 2.6 
White/black 1.4 
Healthy/health problems 0.6 
Non-manual/manual 3.1 
 
If there were no unions the gender pay gap would be 2.6% wider and the race pay gap 
1.4% bigger.1  These are very substantial effects.  They can be put into perspective by a 
comparison with the impact of the national minimum wage (NMW).  Its introduction in 1999 
had a specially favourable effect on female pay – two thirds of those affected were women – 
and it narrowed the gender differential by a little under 1%.  Compare this with unions’ 
impact:  unions compress the gender pay differential by 2.6% - treble the impact of the initial 
NMW. 
 
4.2  Equal opportunities and family friendly policies 
 
Union recognition is associated with a much greater likelihood of the workplace having some 
form of equal opportunity (EO) policy and an array of family friendly policies designed to 
encourage female employment.  Fernie and Gray (2000a) summarise the evidence thus:  
“Women in unionised workplaces are much better off in terms of career opportunities, 
flexible work arrangements and general support for family responsibilities than their 
counterparts in non-union workplaces” (p.3).  The evidence is set out in Table 11.  There is 
not a single indicator of EO or family friendly policies which is more likely to be found in a 
non-union than in a union workplace.  Under EO it will be seen that unionised workplaces are 
more likely to have a policy, to monitor it and to measure its impact on the workplace.  
Likewise, where a union is recognised, flexible work practices are more common including 
parental leave, working from home, term only contracts, the possibility of switching from 
full- to part-time employment and job shares.  Few workplaces provide nurseries or financial 
help for childcare but, again, such policies are more common in unionised establishments.  
                                                 
1 This impact of unions on the wage structure is estimated from differences between union and non-union wages 
in the presence of unions.  This evidence is then used to calculate what wages would be in the absence of 
unions.  The implied assumptions and method of calculation is set out in Metcalf et al., 2001. 
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Over two-fifths of non-union workplaces do not provide any of these benefits, more than 
twice the fraction of unionised establishments with none. 
The information in Table 11 is, of course, raw cross-tabulated data.  It might be, for 
example, that the reason unionised workplaces are more likely to have these policies is 
simply because unions are disproportionately recognised in larger workplaces or the public 
sector, which themselves make more intense use of EO and flexible work.  Fernie and Gray 
(2000b) investigated this possibility and found that even when controls are made for sector, 
public / private, workplace size, HRM policy etc, such EO and family friendly policies are 
still positively associated with recognition.  Some examples of extra likelihood of such 
policies being found in unionised workplaces are set out in Table 12.  Union recognition is 
strongly associated with the incidence of various equal opportunities policies.  For example 
non-union workplaces are 20% less likely to have an equal opportunities policy on gender 
than their unionised counterpart.  Family friendly policies are also more likely to be found in 
workplaces with union recognition but the strength and significance of such associations are 
weaker than those for equal opportunities. 
 
4.3  Industrial injuries 
 
Ever since the Webbs (1902) wrote about industrial injuries a century ago, it has been 
recognised that a union presence in a workplace is likely to reduce the rate of industrial 
accidents.  There are a number of routes which produce this outcome.  For example, unions 
lobby for safety legislation and, on occasion, might take industrial action locally to make the 
workplace safer.  Many trade unions also provide health and safety courses for officials and 
lay activists.  Further, a union presence will tend to promote “voice” over “exit”:  where a 
union is recognised, employees with concerns about accidents are more likely to be listened 
to rather than labelled as a nuisance. 
The 1998 WERS permits a full analysis of the associations between unionisation and 
accidents (see Litwin, 2000).  An industrial accident is where an employee has sustained any 
one of eight listed injuries during working hours over the last 12 months, including bone 
fractures, burns, amputations and any injury that results in immediate hospitalisation for more 
than 24 hours.  The accident rate is the number of such accidents divided by the number of 
employees in the workplace.  Many factors other than union recognition influence the 
accident rate.  Thus, Litwin controls for:  the vintage of the workplace; % male in the 
workforce; size of workplace measured by number of employees; climate of employee 
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relations at the workplace; whether or not health and safety matters are discussed by a 
committee or by a joint consultative council; and industry. 
The evidence shows first, that unions are more likely to be found in workplaces where 
the likelihood of any accident occurring is higher, even when controlling for the variables 
listed above.  Thus, the likelihood of one or more (ie any) accidents is 8% higher in a 
workplace with union recognition than in a non-union workplace.  This association surely 
arises, as Nichols (1997) argues, because “it is not trade unions that call forth unsafe working 
conditions, but rather unsafe working conditions that call forth trade unions” (p.151).  More 
importantly, second, the accident rate is lower where unions are recognised.  The raw rate in 
the WERS sample are: 
 
 
Mean accident 
rate % 
With union recognition 1.55 
Non-union workplace 2.07 
 
This finding is confirmed when we focus on just those 639 workplaces which have had 
one or more accidents.  The presence of a union lowers the accident rate in these workplaces 
by a quarter compared with a similar non-union establishment – we may call this the “safety 
valve” effect of unions.  This is important evidence when combined with the findings of 
Sandy and Elliott (1996).  Their research showed that the compensating wage differential for 
extra risk of accident or death was lower for union workers than for non-union employees.  
They speculated that “the main thrust of union policy may be to reduce the incidences of fatal 
accidents rather than to improve the ex ante compensation for facing fatal risks” (p.303).  
Their suggestion is entirely consistent with our evidence. 
Flanders was right.  Unions do indeed have an important sword of justice impact, 
summarised in Table 13.  It has been shown, for example, that unions temper pay inequality, 
promote equal opportunities and family friendly policies and cut accidents.  Emphasis on 
such outcomes may well appeal to many present non-members if and when they ever get 
asked to join a union and it is to the question of union resurgence we now turn. 
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5.  Union Resurgence? 
 
5.1  Background 
 
How might unions reverse declining density and achieve a sustained rise in membership?  
Broadly, there are two possible routes to revival.  Either employment in unionised sectors of 
the economy has to grow relative to non-union employment or unions must engage in more 
intense organising activity. 
Frankly, it is most unlikely that any boost in the aggregate number of jobs in the labour 
market will occur disproportionately in the unionised sector.  While there are plans for a 
modest rise in the number of police, nurses and teachers the (highly unionised) public sector 
will not experience much growth in employment in the next decade.  In manufacturing the 
number of jobs has more than halved (from 9 million to 4 million) since 1966; anyway, recall 
from Table 7 that unions are finding it just as difficult to get recognised in new 
manufacturing plants as they are in new service sector workplaces.  Similarly, there is no 
suggestion of a strong growth in jobs in the utilities or transport.  It is likely, instead, that the 
major share of any growth in employment will occur in private services with a present union 
density of around 15%.  So disproportionate growth in employment in the union sector is not 
the route to a restoration of unions’ fortunes. 
Alternatively, unions can invest more in organising activity, which may yield a larger 
return presently than in the last two decades because the climate of opinion fostered by the 
state is no longer hostile to collective labour institutions.  There are a number of channels for 
such investment in organising.  Either the focus can be on individual employees, for example 
the 3 million free riders noted in Table 3, or the workplace or the firm can be the focus of 
attention and recognition can be achieved, in principle, in three main ways.  First, the 
marriage between capital and labour might by based on true love – a partnership keenly 
sought by each party.  Next, the marriage might be pragmatic – one of convenience – such 
that the employer, while preferring to remain non-union, voluntarily agrees to recognition as 
a second best in order to avoid confrontation.  Finally, it might be a shotgun marriage 
imposed after due process on a reluctant employer by an institution of the state. 
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5.2  Individuals 
 
Unions both emphasise procedures and cause outcomes which, in principle, might appeal to 
many employees who are not presently members.  In Section 4 their “sword of justice” role 
was set out:  unions cut accidents, encourage strong equal opportunities and family friendly 
policies and cause the distribution of pay to be more equal.  In addition, for example, unions 
promote lifelong learning (see eg Unions 21, 2000), insurance and even discounted ISAs 
(Trade Union Fund Managers, 2000). 
The most obvious group to target, and probably the cheapest to sign up, are the free 
riders – “in-fill” recruitment.  It was shown in Table 3 that of the 8.5 million employees 
covered by a collective agreement under two thirds (5.4 million) are union members so there 
are 3 million such free riders.  Alternatively, simply restoring density where recognition does 
exist to its 1980 level would yield over 2 million extra members. 
Union density has plummeted since 1990 even where unions are still recognised – 
employees “lost their appetite for unionism”.  Why?  Charlwood (2000) investigated this 
using the British Social Attitudes Survey.  He states that a key influence on the decision of an 
individual to belong or not to a trade union turns on that individual’s perception of union 
strength or weakness:  if the union is weak why bother to belong?  He attributes the fall in 
density in the 1990s to the introduction of new management techniques – the 
individualisation of employment contracts (see Brown et al., 1998) for example – which 
weakened unions.  Case studies (eg Darlington, 1995 and Fairbrother, 2000) hint that the 
membership losses are compounded by the retirement of long standing union reps and 
activists who are uncomfortable with the new management regime.  Edwards (2000) notes 
that the decline in density in the 1990s coincided with the “servicing model” where unions 
provide selected services to their members such as credit cards and access to health care 
benefits.  As he notes:  “this model has not fared well”. 
This evidence on why employees belong or not to unions yields an important insight 
(due to Ed Heery).  If individuals are more likely to join or re-join a union when it is active 
then building collective organisation is an important complement to individual recruitment 
campaigns.  Regaining recognition at News International would, for example, have a 
symbolic importance well beyond that one firm and yield extra members in 
already-recognised workplaces. 
Greater effort is probably required when the focus is the 13.6 million employees (57%) 
who are neither covered by collective bargaining nor union members.  A number of 
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initiatives are occurring to recruit among this large heterogeneous group.  These include the 
TUC Organising Academy established in 1997 and various initiatives in individual unions 
including setting up organising departments, increased training in recruitment methods, 
attempts to re-deploy generalist officers to recruitment activities and use of electronic media 
for recruitment purposes (see Heery et al., 2000b for more details). 
The TUC Organising Academy is “to train a new generation of union organisers and 
foster a ‘culture of organising’ within trade unions”.  Its purpose is to develop skilled union 
organisers – the organising model - through a combination of classroom training interspersed 
with placements working on organising campaigns arranged by the sponsor.  The academy 
can be evaluated using cost benefit analysis with data from Heery et al., (2000a).  In 1998 
and 1999 the 50 organisers targeted around 600 employing organisations and directly 
recruited some 7500 new union members.  Further, the campaigns to which they contributed 
generated some 18,000 new members, implying a cost per recruit of some £77.  Union dues 
per year are mainly above £77 and the recruits would presumably stay in membership more 
than one year, implying (even if the organisers went for easier targets first) that the Academy 
is a worthwhile investment.  But, as Heery et al. themselves point out, such recruitment is but 
a small proportion of the 500,000 recruits per year required if – consequent on the normal 
churning in the labour market – unions are to even maintain present density levels.  This 
implies that the Organising Academy is a rather minor component of individual recruitment 
and should be thought of as but one among many recruitment initiatives taking place.  
Further, it is probably best evaluated by monitoring the subsequent strength of workplace 
organisation such that membership is sustained and grows long after any campaign by 
workplace activists ends. 
The Organising Academy is part of the New Unionism project designed to “increase the 
levels of union membership among young people [via] more effort in organising non-union 
workplaces, particularly in the private sector” (Trade Union Congress, 2000).  The 
Organising Academy has provided a mechanism for a younger generation of activists in their 
20s and 30 to become union officials.  Trainees have been involved in specific projects to 
recruit young people.  For example, Unison trainees have organised campaigns among 
student nurses, a Society of Telecom Executives trainee focused on recruiting graduate 
recruits in British Telecom and a Transport and Salaried Staff Association trainee recruited 
further education students on travel and tourism vocational courses.  Other initiatives to boost 
youth membership include altering the format of the TUC annual youth conference away 
from a motion-based event to one focused on campaigns and skill development, the 
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appointment by all big unions of full-time Youth Officers to coordinate and support young 
members activities are a “rights to work” help line aimed at working students.  The evidence 
in Section 3 on the historically low levels of union membership among young employees 
hints that this is a sensible investment by the union movement although the returns are mostly 
still in the future. 
Unions are also using electronic media for recruitment initiatives.  In Call Centres – the 
engine room of the new economy sectors like on-line banking and telecommunications – 
innovative campaigns have used e-mail to target new members and the telecoms union, 
Connect, also hands out a leaflet carrying details of a website where workers can log on and 
fill in an online survey about their terms and conditions (as Sue Fernie put it – from the 
Webbs to the web page!).  Membership of Connect rose 5% in 2000. 
Once an individual union has achieved very high density rates in its traditional sphere 
of influence, any expansion of membership can only be realised by branching out into other 
areas which might antagonise existing members.  The Royal College of Nursing faces such a 
dilemma.  It has grown progressively over the last two decades to achieve a current 
membership of 325,000 – all qualified nurses or students.  It recently consulted members on a 
change to its constitution to allow some health care assistants into a special category of 
membership.  The RCN is a fine example of a craft union with a professional ethos and, not 
surprisingly, this proposed move by the leadership to become more open met fierce resistance 
from some members.  But the rise of the health care assistant, increasingly taking on the less 
skilled nursing tasks and increasingly holding vocational qualifications, meant the union 
cannot duck the possible trade-off between expansion and dilution and the proposal was 
agreed. 
 
5.3  Recognition 
 
The 1998 British Social Attitudes Survey indicates that 40% of non-union employees in 
non-union workplaces would join if a union was available – an untapped pool of over 3 
million employees who come under the umbrella of the Employment Relations Act 
(Charlwood 2000).  So getting the employer to recognise a union is a potentially fruitful route 
to higher membership.  But how?  If the aim of a union is to switch income from capital to 
labour what incentive is there for the employer to recognise a union? 
In the 1950s and 1960s union recognition spread because unions were able to impose 
costs on the employer.  In newspaper publishing, for example, some recognitions achieved by 
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the NGA and SOGAT resulted from the threat of a secondary boycott.  The NGA organised 
ink producers and SOGAT organised newsprint manufacturers.  Publishers were threatened 
by the possible withholding of ink or paper supply if they would not recognise the respective 
unions in the print sector.  In the West Midlands many of the recognitions achieved by the 
TGWU in the engineering industry were a consequence of a threat that TGWU drivers would 
not deliver supplies to the engineering plants.  These days such mechanisms to achieve 
recognition are outlawed.  Now recognition occurs voluntarily or via the law.  Voluntary 
recognition stems from either true love – cooperation between labour and capital, a proper 
partnership – or a pragmatic second best – a marriage of convenience.  The legal route, 
inevitably associated with adversarial industrial relations, is a shotgun marriage imposed on a 
resistant employer by the Central Arbitration Committee under the provisions of the 1999 
Employment Relations Act. 
 
5.3.1  Legal route 
 
If an employer will not recognise a trade union voluntarily the recognition provisions of the 
1999 Employment Relation Act, which came into force in June 2000, permit the use of the 
law to achieve recognition.  The way in which ballots for recognition will work is set out in 
the appendix.  In summary, if a union can prove a majority of membership in the bargaining 
unit then it gains recognition.  If not, a ballot is held in which the union must win 50%+ in 
the ballot and must have at least 40% of the bargaining unit voting “yes”.  It is too early to 
assess the impact of this legislation but it is unlikely – by itself – to lead to a resurgence of 
membership via a flood of new recognition agreements.  There are a number of reasons for 
thinking this. 
First, simple arithmetic.  Say, generously from the union viewpoint, there are 5 
elections a week, with an average of 400 voters each.  This implies 100,000 employees a year 
vote in CAC-sponsored elections.  Remember that 15 million employees are not covered by 
collective agreements.  Assume, on the basis of past UK experience in the 1970s (Beaumont, 
1987; Wood, 2000) and current US evidence (Farber, 1999), a union win rate of 0.5.  This 
implies that 50,000 extra employees per year would be in newly recognised bargaining units 
or 0.3% of the non-covered sector.  Such a success rate would not even offset losses from 
plant closures, derecognitions and declining density where there is recognition.  Further, the 
pool of winnable bargaining units will decline over time because rational unions will initially 
target more winnable bargaining units. 
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Second, the USA has had a similar law for more than half a century yet under 
1-employee-in-10 in the private sector is a union member and recently unions have won 
under half of the ballots organised by the National Labour Relations Board (Logan, 2000). 
Third, various forms of statutory recognition procedures existed in the UK in the 1970s.  
The 1971 Industrial Relations Act established a tight legal framework to decide on the sole 
bargaining agent.  When this was repealed the 1975 Employment Protection Act set out 
procedures for referring recognition issues to the Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration 
Service (ACAS).  This statutory route to recognition ended in 1980.  Although union 
membership rose by nearly 2 million during the 1970s, when this previous statutory system 
operated, the General Secretary of the TUC states that such recognition laws added only 
60,000 workers to union ranks (Financial Times, 6 June 2000, see also Gall and McKay, 
2000). 
Fourth, triggering the law means that the employer is hostile to recognition.  There are 
already consultancy firms offering their services to such employers to fuel their antagonism 
and to encourage them to resist unions by, for example, suggesting a particular definition of 
the bargaining unit, persuading the recognition agency (the Central Arbitration Committee) 
that recognition is “not in the interests of good industrial relations” and by encouraging 
employees – by fair means or foul – to vote “no” in any ballot.  The likely tone of such 
“union-busting” campaigns can be gauged from contributions during a seminar on this issue 
organised in May 2000 by law firm Eversheds:  “UK employers should view a union 
organisational effort as an economic heart attack.  Organising labour unions are 
philosophically dedicated to coercing employers into economic partnership with them” (Alan 
Lips, partner in the Labor and Employment Group at leading US firm Taft, Stettinsus and 
Hollister, quoted in The Observer, 4 June 2000).  In the USA unions have always had a lower 
success rate in recognition elections where the electorate (workforce) is large than where it is 
small, and this workforce size-gap has widened substantially over time (Farber, 1999).  This 
surely reflects the greater use of expensive union-busting consultants by larger firms who can 
more easily afford such cost. 
Even though contemporary US, and previous UK, experience with statutory recognition 
provides no strong suggestion that this is the main route to resurgence many unions are likely 
to brave the hostility of employers and embark on recognition via the law.  In some cases this 
is because there are old scores to settle.  The National Union of Journalists, which 
experienced widespread derecognition in the 1980s, will probably use the Act to try to 
achieve recognition at News International (Times, Sun), The Independent and Associated 
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Newspapers (owners of the Daily Mail).  Similarly there are likely to be attempts to overturn 
previous derecognitions in chemicals, oil and telecommunications.  In other cases the Act 
will be used because, despite substantial membership, the company refuses to acknowledge 
the union.  For example the TGWU has 400 members among the 2000 workers at the East 
Kilbride plant of Motorola but, as the company will not negotiate about recognition, the legal 
route will probably follow.  Likewise, the financial services union UNIFI has a long standing 
dispute with HSBC about recognition for managers and is likely to trigger the law.  In yet 
other instances there may be no history of unionisation – call centres on greenfield sites for 
example – but the union believes there is a silent majority in favour of representation which 
will be demonstrated in a card count or a ballot. 
Trade unions will need to think very carefully about these shotgun marriages.  Willman 
(2001) describes “a union” as a conglomeration of bargaining units.  Such a unit achieved via 
the statutory route is, according to Willman, more likely to meet with a “recalcitrant 
employer” adding to the already one third of workplaces with recognition which Willman 
states have no meaningful collective bargaining.  Further, such units are more prone to be 
financially non-viable – costing more to operate than they generate in revenue – thus 
stretching the resources of the union.  If this is so the main rationale for unions’ keenness for 
the law on statutory recognition must be explained by the shadow cast by the law 
encouraging marriages of convenience to which we now turn. 
 
5.3.2  Voluntary recognition agreements 
 
A company will voluntarily sign a recognition agreement for one of two reasons.  Either the 
management genuinely believe the union has something to offer or, alternatively, the 
management takes a pragmatic approach.  It is not keen on unions but not outright hostile and 
so, anticipating a possible legal challenge, recognises the union of its choice (which must be 
independent and not a company sweetheart union), and negotiates a package with which it 
can rest content (see eg Wood, 2000). 
Genuine partnerships include the recognition agreement between GB Airways and the 
AEEU covering 400 cabin crew, engineers, ground and office staff and recent agreements at 
the Inland Revenue, European Gas Turbines, Unisys and Tesco.  Such agreements aim to 
switch the focus of relations between labour and capital away from battling over the size of 
the slices towards achieving a bigger cake.  It should be noted that the latter four agreements 
were not, however, new recognitions.  Rather the existing partners agreed to turn over a new 
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leaf.  At Tesco for example the old system of industrial relations was seen as unsatisfactory 
by both the union and the employer.  The annual wage negotiations had become ritualistic 
and the company had begun to question the value of its relationship with the union.  
Communication was poor and consultation was limited.  The partnership agreement between 
Tesco and USDAW includes new consultation structures, greater exchange of information, 
more upward communication and investment on the training of union representatives at all 
levels (see Industrial Relations Services, 1999) for more details of the Tesco agreement and 
Heery (1999) for an insightful examination of social partnership).   
Pragmatic recognition – marriages of convenience – sometimes dressed up as 
partnership agreements – may well also suit both parties.  The employer might, for example, 
achieve provisions on dispute resolution or performance-related pay which may not be 
available once the relationship is adversarial.  And from the union viewpoint, recognition 
imposed on a combative employer may prove a pyrric victory.  If an employer fails to comply 
with a CAC-imposed agreement s/he will only face a fine (and never imprisonment) when it 
is “appropriate to do justice in the case”.  Further, there is no explicit duty on an employer to 
bargain in good faith once the union is ostensibly recognised.  Any widespread lack of good 
faith would presumably require the imposition of pay rates and conditions determined 
elsewhere under collective bargaining on the recalcitrant employer but the Act contains no 
such sanction.  This second, pragmatic, form of voluntary recognition can be thought of as an 
indirect effect of – the shadow cast by – the legal route discussed above. 
There were 748 voluntary recognition agreements signed between 1995 and September 
2000 (see Gall, 2000).  Around half were signed in the four-year period 1995-98, then the 
pace quickened with the other half sealed in 1999 and 2000.  Gall believes that these 
agreements have brought 0.5 million new workers under recognition, implying that the 
“average” agreement covers over 650 employees.  He states that “recent ‘scalps’ have been 
Virgin Atlantic, Barclaycall, Tilbury Docks, Newsquest Newspapers and United Parcel 
Service”.  Further, he calculates that there are more than 600 current campaigns for 
recognition covering a further 0.5 million employees and in 170 of these cases (80,000 
members) unions have already recruited more than half the relevant workforce. 
In further analysis Gall and McKay (2000) note that these campaigns are “heavily 
skewed” towards manufacturing and former public sector organisations and “unions are not 
concentrating on the employment growth areas such as Call Centres, retail and business 
services and hotels and restaurants.  This results from trade unions recruiting and organising 
within relatively familiar areas and where they already have some membership base”.  This is 
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confirmed in Table 14 which sets out full details of recognitions monitored by both Gall and 
by Industrial Relations Services (2000) from January 1997 to June 2000 just prior to the new 
legal machinery for recognition coming on stream.  IRS managed to track 212 new (full) 
recognitions covering 150,000 employees.  Half of these workers were in public services or 
ex-public sectors such as NHS caterers and local authority outsourced payroll teams.  A 
further 50,000 were in the familiar manufacturing, finance and transport and communication 
sectors, leaving just 1-in-6 of the newly covered workers in the rest of the private service 
sector. 
Although partnership agreements have attracted considerable publicity and comment 
(see IRS, 1999) only 1-in-5 of the deals describe themselves, or have been described, as such.  
And among even these, very few comply with the Trade Union Congress (1998) model 
principles which include a commitment to employment security and flexibility, lifelong 
learning and the sharing of information.  Similarly 1980s type so-called new style deals 
featuring no strike clauses coupled with compulsory arbitration only account for around 40 
cases. 
In some instances a union is recognised but bargaining is conducted through company 
councils or staff forums where non-union members are also represented.  Some 40 such cases 
exist, including both GB Airways and Monarch Airlines (with AEEU), normally arising when 
the company adds union recognition to its extant consultation arrangements.  Gall also notes 
that unions have cracked some “hard nuts” including charities (National Lottery Charity 
Board and MSF) and firms in road haulage and air transport, docks (recognition of TGWU at 
Tilbury), call centres (eg Barclaycall and UNIFI), retail and business service and BBC 
outsourced work (Capita and GMB and Unison). 
If membership is to increase it will be important for unions to achieve recognition in 
some large organisations.  IRS (2000) tracked all new recognitions between January 1997 and 
June 2000.  There were 210 cases covering 150,000 newly covered employees but just 5 
cases accounted for half these employees.  The deal between Compass and UNISON covers 
50,000 NHS catering staff, for example, and that between the Offshore Contractors 
Association and the AEEU and GMB cover 10,000 oil and gas offshore workers. 
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6.  Conclusion 
 
Union membership fell by over 5 million in the 1980s and 1990s, the longest sustained and 
deepest haemorrhage of members in British labour history.  Macroeconomic variables, 
changes in the composition of jobs and the workforce and the legal onslaught against unions 
probably all played some part in accounting for the decay in collectivism.  But it is necessary 
to go behind such correlations to understand the process of corrosion. 
Two main factors were at work.  First, unions failed to get recognised in most 
workplaces established after 1980.  There were insufficient “births” to offset the “deaths” 
from the wholesale rundown of union strongholds in sectors like coal, steel and shipbuilding 
and the trickle of derecognitions.  Second, where unions were recognised density fell 
alarmingly, particularly in the 1990s once the closed shop was outlawed.  By the turn of the 
century there were 8.5 million employees covered by collective bargaining but under two 
thirds were union members, implying over 3 million free riders. 
Employment is unlikely to grow proportionately more quickly in unionised sectors than 
in non-union sectors.  It follows that any resurgence in unions’ fortunes turns an organising 
activity among individuals and employers.  Despite excellent vision and leadership both 
nationally and locally, it is hard to be too optimistic about union fortunes over the next 
decade.  In the first place organising activity is expensive and represents a “tax” on existing 
members.  Then there is the arithmetic:  Gall states that new recognitions have added (gross) 
100,000 covered employees a year, on average, 1995-2000.  It is almost inconceivable that 
the legal route to recognition will directly add more than a further 50,000 employees 
annually.  Even if organising campaigns were ten times larger than those mounted by the 
Organising Academy the annual gross extra inflow of members would only be 90,000.  Such 
organising activities would therefore yield around 0.25 million newly covered employees a 
year.  This would not even keep pace with net job creation, running at around 0.35 million 
per annum since 1994 and would hardly be enough to offset losses from closures, 
derecognitions, retirements etc (and not all employees in newly recognised workplaces would 
be union members).  So unions will hope that the indirect impact of the law is powerful, 
promoting a greater flow of ostensible voluntary recognition agreements than in recent years.  
Further, although signing up sufficient employers is vital, unions will also wish to pay greater 
attention to declining density where they remain recognised:  if unions could retain their 
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existing members and sign up one tenth of the 3 million free riders each year their fortunes 
would be transformed. 
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Table 1 
Trade union membership and density 1950-1999, UK 
 
 
 Membership 
(000) 
Density among 
civilian workforce (%) 
1950  9,289 40.6 
1960  9,835 40.9 
1970  11,178 45.8 
1980  12,947 49.0 
1990  9,947 35.3 
1999  7,807 26.8 
 
Note:  Trade union membership data from annual report of Certification Officer.  See text for 
fuller discussion of content of these data. 
 
Sources:  Civilian workforce data from British Labour Statistics:  Historical Abstract, HMSO 
1971; DE Gazette, Historical Supplement, 2, November 1989; Labour Market Trends, 
various issues. 
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Table 2 
Trade union membership and density 1989-1999 
Great Britain, employees in employment 
 
 
 Members  
(000) 
Density 
(%) 
1989 8,939 39.0 
1990 8,835 38.1 
1991 8,602 37.5 
1992 7,956 35.8 
1993 7,767 35.1 
1994 7,530 33.6 
1995 7,309 32.1 
1996 7,244 31.2 
1997 7,154 30.2 
1998 7,152 29.6 
1999 7,257 29.5 
 
Note:  The membership data (column 1) include self-employed people who are members, 
approximately 0.3 million in 1999.  The density data (column 2) refer to membership among 
employees in employment only. 
 
Source:  Hicks (2000), Table 2, data from Labour Force Survey. 
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Table 3 
Coverage of collective agreements and union membership 
Great Britain, employees in employment, autumn 1999 
Millions (%) 
 
 
  Union 
Members  
 
  Yes No Total 
Yes 5.4 
(23) 
3.1 
(13) 
8.5 
(36) Covered by 
collective 
agreement No 1.6 
(7) 
13.6 
(57) 
15.2 
(64) 
 
Total 7.0 
(30) 
16.7 
(70) 
23.7 
(100) 
 
Source:  Calculated from evidence in Hicks (2000) using data from Labour Force Survey. 
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Table 4 
Characteristics of union density 
Great Britain, employees in employment, autumn 1999 
 
 
Characteristic 
Density 
(%) 
Characteristic 
Density 
(%) 
All 30 Workplace 
 
 
Demographics 
 
Gender 
 Male 
 Female 
 
Age 
 <20 
 20 – 29 
 30 – 39 
 40 – 49 
 50+ 
 
Ethnic Origin 
 White 
 Non-white 
 
Highest Qualification 
 Degree 
 Other Higher 
 A-level 
 GCSE 
 No 
 
 
 
31 
28 
 
 
6 
20 
31 
39 
34 
 
 
30 
27 
 
 
37 
44 
29 
22 
25 
 
Size 
 < 25 employees 
 25+ employees 
 
Selected Industries 
 Manufacturing 
 Hotels & Restaurants 
 Business Services 
 Public Administration 
 Education, Health 
 
Country – Selected 
Regions  
 England 
 Scotland 
 Wales 
 North East 
 South East 
 
 15 
 37 
 
 
 28 
 6 
 11 
 61 
 50 
 
 
 28 
 39 
 35 
 40 
 22 
Job-related 
 
Length of Service 
 < 2 years 
 2 – 10 years 
 10+ years 
 
Selected Occupations  
 Professional 
 Craft 
 Sales 
 
 
 
14 
27 
54 
 
 
49 
32 
11 
  
 
Source:  Hicks (2000), Table 5, data from Labour Force Survey. 
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Table 5 
Changes in worker voice arrangements 
1984 to 1998 (%) 
 
    
Type of voice arrangement 1984 1990 1998 
Union only 
Union and non-union 
Non-union only 
No voice 
 
Representative voice only 
Representative and direct voice 
Direct voice only 
No voice 
 
Weighted base 
Unweighted base 
24 
43 
17 
16 
 
29 
45 
11 
16 
 
2,000 
2,019 
14 
39 
28 
19 
 
18 
43 
20 
19 
 
1,997 
2,059 
9 
33 
40 
17 
 
14 
39 
30 
17 
 
1,991 
1920 
 
Notes:  Base:  all workplaces with 25 or more employees.  Union voice defined as one or 
more trade unions recognised by employers for pay bargaining or a joint consultative 
committee meeting at least once a month with representatives chosen through union channels.  
Non-union voice defined as a joint consultative committee meeting at least once a month with 
representatives not chosen through union channels, regular meetings between senior 
management and the workforce, briefing groups, problem-solving groups, or non-union 
employee representatives. 
 
Source:  Bryson (2000) adapted from Millward, Bryson and Forth (2000), Tables 4.13 and 
4.15.   
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Table 6 
Closure rates, new recognition and derecognition 
in British workplaces 
 
 
  1984 – 90 1990 - 98 
 
A 
 
Closure Rate 
 With recognised unions 
 No recognised unions 
 
 
 
.14 
.15 
 
 
.14 
.15 
B Derecognitions / New 
Recognitions  
 Derecognitions 
 New recognitions 
 
.09 
.04 
 
.06 
.04 
 
 
Source:  Machin (2000) calculated from successive WIRS/WERS panel data; closure rate 
from trading sector sample only. 
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Table 7 
Union recognition by age of establishment 
 
 
A. Union recognition by age of establishment 
 
Age 1980 1984 1990 1998 
Under 10 years .59 .58 .34 .27 
10+ years .65 .68 .59 .50 
 
 
 
B. Union recognition in 1998 and set up date of establishment 
 
Set up All 
establishments 
Private sector 
manufacturing 
Private sector 
services 
Public sector 
1980 or before 
.54 
[559] 
.50 
[89] 
.28 
[257] 
.88 
[213] 
Post 1980 
.29 
[528] 
.14 
[108] 
.18 
[330] 
.85 
[89] 
Gap  
(standard error) 
-.26 
(.02) 
-.36 
(.05) 
-.10 
(.03) 
-.02 
(.03) 
 
Notes and Sources:  Taken from Machin (2000) Tables 2, 3.  Panel A from the four 
WIRS / WERS samples.  Panel B from 1998 WERS sample based on establishments with 
reported age data with at least 25 workers; weighted sample size in square brackets; gaps 
are the differences in union recognition for establishments set up post 1980 compared to 
those set up in 1980 or before. 
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Table 8 
Decline of the closed shop 
 
 
Type of recognition 
Number of workplaces 
in WIRS/WERS 
weighted sample 
Density % 
 1984 1990 1998 1984 1990 1998 
Closed shop 337 68 17 87 84 61 
Strong management 
recommendation 
331 321 176 79 77 68 
Just recognition 458 514 623 55 62 53 
 
Note:  Base is all establishments with 25+ employees which recognise one or more trade 
unions. 
 
Source:  Millward et al. (2000), Table 5.5 
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Table 9 
Unions and the distribution of pay 
 
 
 Union Non-union 
Raw 
 Standard deviation 
 90 – 10 
 
 
0.457 
1.14 
 
0.592 
1.47 
Residuals 
 Standard deviation 
 90 – 10 
 
0.330 
0.843 
 
0.439 
1.008 
 
Notes:  
1. Sample size is 16,730. 
2. Standard deviation and 90 – 10 from log earnings 
3. The residuals are estimated from a regression equation containing the following 
independent variables:  age, qualifications, workplace size, industry, occupation, region, 
marital status, public / private, full-time / part-time, permanent / temporary, gender, able 
bodied / disabled, ethnicity. 
 
Source:  Labour Force Survey, Autumn 1998. 
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Table 10 
Impact of unionisation on pay structure by 
gender, race, health and occupation 
 
 
Group Unionised % 
Premium 
% 
Without unions, 
wage structure 
would be wider by % 
Male 
Female 
33 
31 
0.0 
8.7 2.6 
White 
Non-white 
32 
32 
3.9 
8.4 1.4 
Healthy 
Health problems 
32 
33 
3.9 
5.3 0.5 
Non-manual 
Manual 
32 
32 
3.0 
12.9 3.1 
 
Notes:  
1. Total sample size is 16,489. 
2. Hourly pay premium associated with union membership estimated from regression 
equation with the following controls:  age, marital status, qualifications, part-time worker, 
temporary worker, industry, occupation, region, public sector, workplace size and (as 
appropriate) gender, ethnicity and health. 
3. In all the regressions but one the coefficient on unionisation is significant at better than 
1%.  Further, in each pairwise comparison the premia are significantly different from one 
another at 5% or better. 
4. The method by which the last column – how much wider the wage structure would be in a 
notional labour market without unions – is calculated, is fully detailed in Metcalf et al., 
(2001). 
 
Source:  Labour Force Survey, Autumn 1998. 
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Table 11 
Union recognition of EO and 
family friendly policies 
 
 Workplaces % 
 Union 
recognition 
Non-union 
Recognition / non-union  45  55 
Equal Opportunity Policy 
Formal written policy on EO or managing diversity 
Collect statistics on posts held by men / women 
Monitor promotions by gender, ethnicity, etc 
Review selection and other procedures to identify indirect 
discrimination 
Review relative pay rates of different groups 
Measure effects of EO policies (only workplaces with EO policies) 
 
 
 91 
 49 
 26 
 39 
 19 
 24 
 
 54 
 18 
 7 
 11 
 14 
 9 
   
Entitlement To Family Friendly Benefits For Non-Managerial 
Employees 
Parental leave 
Working at or from home in normal working hours 
Term-time only contracts 
Switching from full-time to part-time employment 
Job sharing schemes 
Workplace nursery or nursery linked with workplace 
Financial help / subsidy to parents for child care 
None of these 
 
 
 
 51 
 17 
 28 
 64 
 50 
 7 
 5 
 19 
 
 
 22 
 11 
 12 
 42 
 15 
 2 
 3 
 43 
 
Source:  Fernie and Gray (2000a) from approximately 1700 workplaces with 25+ employees 
WERS 1998. 
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Table 12 
Extra likelihood of policy being found in workplace with 
which recognition compared with “twin” workplace  
without recognition 
 Coefficient % 
Equal Opportunities   
Formal policy .51  19.6 
Collect statistics .27  6.2 
Promotions monitored by 
gender 
.39  2.5 
Selection procedures reviewed .35  4.4 
Measure effects .40  1.6 
Family Friendly 
Parental leave 
Entitled to job share 
Workplace nursery 
No family friendly entitlement 
 
.36 
.18 
.23 
-.23 
 
 12.1 
 3.5 
 0.1 
 -8.9 
 
Notes:  Coefficients and marginal (%) effects calculated from probit regressions.  Control 
variables are:  HRM practices (10 variables), private sector, % female, workplace size, 
industry.  All coefficients for equal opportunities significant at 5% or better.  Family friendly 
coefficients non-significant except for parental leave. 
 
Source:  Fernie and Gray (2000b) from approximately 1700 workplaces with 25+ employees, 
WERS 1998. 
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Table 13 
Sword of justice effect of unions 
 
Indicator Sample 
Union 
indicator Control variables Union effect 
 
Author 
 
Pay distribution 
-  standard deviation 
-  pay structure by gender,  race 
etc 
Approx 16,500 
employees from 
Labour Force 
Survey, Autumn 
1998 
Membership Age, qualifications, workplace 
size, industry, region, marital 
status, public/private, ft/pt, 
permanent/temporary 
(i) sd union .330 
 sd non-union  .439 
 
(ii) without unions wage structure 
 wider by  (%) 
 male/female   
 2.6 
 white/non-white  
 1.4 
 healthy/health problems  0.5 
 non-man/manual  
 3.1 
 
Metcalf et al. 
(2001) 
      
Accident rate 
one of 8 listed injuries  
(eg bone fracture, burns) 
requiring immediate 
hospitalisation for 24 hours + no. 
of such accidents in last 12 
months ÷ no. of employees 
 
WERS 1998 
639 workplaces 
with 1+ accidents 
Recognition % male 
age of wp 
size of wp 
climate of IR in wp 
safety discussed by JCC etc 
industry 
Accident rate (mean 1.85) is a quarter 
lower in wp with union recognition 
Litwin (2000) 
      
Equal opportunities and family 
friendly 
 - EO 6 indicators eg policy    
   on gender 
 - FF 12 indicators eg  
       parental leave 
WERS 1998 
approx 1700 
workplaces 
Recognition HRM (9 variables) 
% male 
private / public 
fixed term contracts 
age of wp 
size of wp 
(i) + ve and significant assoc. 
 between recog and all EO 
 indicators 
 
(ii) + ve assoc between recog and 
 most FF indicators but only 
 significant for parental leave 
Fernie and 
Gray (2000b) 
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Table 14 
New recognitions January 1997 to June 2000 
 
 
 IRS 
(2000) 
Gall 
(2000) 
 
No. of full recognitions 
No. of partial recognitions 
No of employees covered 
 
 
212 
n.a. 
149,756 
 
509 
 34 
182,000 
(from 451 known cases) 
 
SECTOR 
 
Manufacturing and construction 
Public services 
Private services 
 Finance 
 Transport and 
Communication 
 Other 
Ex-public sector 
 Electricity, Gas, Water 
 General eg LA Payroll 
 Catering (ex NHS) 
No. of 
recognitions 
 
78 
12 
 
5 
29 
48 
 
2 
16 
1 
No. of 
employees 
 
28699 
10280 
 
10600 
11329 
23839 
 
  2100 
12938 
50000 
 
TOTAL  
212 
 
149,756 
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Figure 1:  Trade Union Membership in Great Britain 1950 - 1999 
 
Notes and sources: 
 
1. Membership data from the annual reports of the Certification Officer consists of self-
reported membership figures from trade unions head-quartered in Great Britain. 
2. The Labour Force Survey samples 60,000 households every quarter, data on trade 
union membership comes from the third quarter of every year. 
3. See text and Hicks (2000) for further details. 
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Appendix 1 – How Ballots for Recognition Will Work 
 
Unions can ballot for recognition in all companies with more than 20 employees.  Smaller 
companies are exempt.  Recognition allows unions to represent employees in various areas, 
for example collective bargaining for pay and conditions, and representation in grievance 
procedures. 
The process is triggered when a union applies for a ballot.  Usually it will have been 
canvassing for members, so it can meet the requirements to show:  a 10% membership within 
the bargaining unit; the group of workers to be covered by the recognition agreement; and 
that a further 50% are likely to support recognition. 
The employer has 10 days to respond.  It can agree recognition straight away.  If it does 
not there are 20 days for negotiation.  If it still refuses, the Central Arbitration Committee is 
called in.  First it will rule on the bargaining unit (BU).  Employers could have an advantage 
here – the rules say that the bargaining unit must be compatible with ‘effective management’. 
There is a 20-day period for the employer and union to agree the BU.  If at the end of 
that period there is no agreement, the committee will make a decision after another 10 days.  
If the union can prove a majority of membership in that bargaining unit, then it gains 
recognition.  If not, there is a ballot – either postal or at the workplace – within 20 days.  
Costs are shared. 
If the union wins, there is automatic recognition.  If it loses, it cannot re-apply for 
recognition within three years.  The union must not only win 50% in the ballot, but must have 
at least 40% of the BU voting.  One final point is that the union must be able to prove that it 
is genuinely independent – it cannot be a stooge of the employer. 
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Appendix 2 – Workplace Employment Relations Survey 1998 
 
Our main data source is the 1998 Workplace Employee Relations Survey (WERS98).  (Cully 
et al, 1999 provide full details of the survey and information on previous surveys in 1980, 
1984 and 1990).  WERS98 collected detailed information from 2191 workplaces with ten or 
more employees - the largest survey of its kind in the world.  15.8 million people work in 
workplaces with ten or more employees, three quarters of employees in employment in 
Britain.  Large workplaces were over-sampled, but the use of weighting variables allow 
results to be representative of all British workplaces with ten or more employees. 
According to those responsible for the survey it aims to “examine what is, rather than 
what ought to be, the current situation [in employment relations].  It is uniquely well placed 
to do this, because of the manner in which the survey is founded, organised and conducted” 
(Cully et al., 1998:1).  The sponsoring bodies are the Department of Trade and Industry, The 
Economic and Social Research Council, the Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service 
and the Policy Studies Institute.  The survey was designed by a small team from the 
sponsoring bodies in conjunction with leading academics in the field.  The interviewing was 
conducted by Social and Community Planning and Research between October 1997 and June 
1998. 
WERS98 comes in three parts.  The first part is a management questionnaire, 
completed by senior managers responsible for the management of employee relations in the 
workplace.  The response rate for this section of the survey was 80%.  The second section is a 
worker representatives questionnaire:  950 worker representatives were interviewed, a 
response rate of 83% from workplaces with a worker representative.  In a departure from 
previous WERS surveys, WERS98 also contains a short employee questionnaire.  These 
questionnaires were distributed to 25 randomly chosen employees in each workplace.  
Completed questionnaires were returned by 28,323 employees, about two-thirds of those 
distributed. 
WERS98 contains a wealth of detail on pay levels and systems and collective 
representation, along with extensive information on workplace characteristics, allowing us to 
control for other factors that may influence pay systems and the distribution of pay.  The 
section on representation at work contains information on three key areas.  First, the type of 
relationship between management and unions; if the management recognises unions for 
collective bargaining, individual representation or neither.  Second, the structure of 
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workplace trade unionism – the extent of multi-unionism, and the unionisation levels among 
different occupational groups.  Third, the strength of the union indicated by whether a pre- or 
post-entry closed shop exists, and the percentage of employees that are union members.  The 
section on payment systems and pay determination asks questions about different types of 
variable pay schemes present in the workplace; which occupational groups they are applied 
to; and the extent of participation in schemes like employee share ownership in the 
workplace.  The worker representative questionnaire allows the responses in the management 
questionnaire to be verified.  Overall the high response rates make information derived from 
WERS98 extremely reliable. 
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